Most microeconomic and game theoretic models of individual choice overlook adjustment costs. Rather often, the modeler's concern is just with improvement of objectives. This optic doesn't quite …t agents somewhat tied to status quo. If rational, any such agent reasons whether moving to another state be worth his while. For that, the realized gains must outweigh the inconveniences of the move. This note o¤ers some observations as to the fact that change usually entails cost.
Introduction
Game theory and microeconomics -henceforth just called theory -abounds in agentbased models of decision problems. Most instances tend, however, to emphasize three questionable features. First, each concerned agent should, with little or no hesitation, leap directly to a best choice. Second, his behavior ought be totally goal-oriented. Third, he is often depicted as fully detached from history, precedent or status quo.
As modelled, these aspects of behavior invite objections. Choice may emerge step-wise; cost to change can be considerable; and clearly, each arrival comes from some point of departure.
It's comforting therefore, that algorithms geared toward best or better choice, have -at least since Cauchy (1847) -been coached as iterative processes. Typically, these require more than just one step. It's also comforting that recent decades have brought forward procedures that expressly account for adjustment costs. 1 In contrast, much theory sidesteps such procedures. It rather moves straight to terminal outcomes, if any, called equilibria [18] , [25] . Thereby, pressing queries as to attainment, emergence, selection and stability of equilibrium easily escape attention.
For good reasons, various concepts of steady-state solutions exert considerable attraction. Each describes how parties behave, communicate or fare in equilibrium. However, out of equilibrium, the underlying concept rarely provides much guidance. 2 Informatics Departement, University of Bergen, Norway; sjur. ‡aam@uib.no. Many thanks for support are due the Informatics Department and Røwdes Fond. 1 Most of these come with the label "proximal point" algorithm. References include [1] , [13] , [21] and [24] . 2 For examle, in markets, from where might prices come? And in noncooperative games, how could best responses and rational foresights eventually emerge? Two di¤erent hypotheses have been invoked to …ll that void; either is tempting, but neither quite attractive. One posits that agents, even out-of-equilibrium, behave as in equilibrium. The other presumes that each party acts throughout as though fully foresighted, marvelously competent, perfectly rational. 3 More realistic approaches ought tolerate imperfections in agents' capacity to choose, foresee or know. Accordingly, here below, local perceptions replace global views -and improvements substitute for full optimization. While seeking own betterment, agents adapt -usually in somewhat moderate or myopic manner [15] . If so, might they eventually come to a halt? And then, where?
These questions motivate the paper. For preparation, Section 2 considers just one agent, isolated from others. In contrast, Section 3 lets him play normal-form games among non-cooperative strategists. Section 4 concludes by brie ‡y considering extensive-form games of Stackelberg sort.
Preliminaries concerning the single agent
This section introduces notations and preliminaries. To begin with, and to simplify, it considers just one agent. Actually, he holds a "position"
equals 1 if (x 1 ; x 0 ) = 2 X X for some non-empty viability subset X in the ambient space X of alternatives. The "probabilistic" notation b(x 1 jx 0 ) emphasizes that the agent, while conditioned by his departure point x 0 , seeks a suitable arrival point x 1 : In particular, given x 0 2 X, he might
Many formalized decision problems mention no point of departure -or implicitly, the latter is of negligible importance. Moreover, it seems that the agent, upon leaping directly to a very best choice, incurs no cost for "dislodging"himself. 4 Classical and customary instances let
for some gross bene…t function : X ! R[ f 1g, having e¤ective domain X := 1 (R). This case reports no adjustment costs. The agent is fully goal-driven -and never troubled by friction or inertia. More realistically, proximal point methods [21] , [24] 
for some (adjustment) cost function C : X X ! R + [ f+1g which vanishes on the diagonal: C(x 0 jx 0 ) = 0 8x 0 2 X. No symmetry is presumed; it may well happen 3 Assuming so might be justi…able in equilibrium but hardly out of it. 4 At most, such costs are construed as computational.
that C(x 1 jx 0 ) 6 = C(x 0 jx 1 ); the forward fare can di¤er from the backward one. It often appears natural though, that C satis…es the triangle inequality: C( 
Naturally, suppose that staying put entails no improvement; that is, b(x 0 jx 0 ) 0 for all x 0 2 X: Stationary states stand out by allowing no improvements. They solve problem (1) by bringing up contingent …xed points: De…nition 2.1 (stationary states). x 2 X is declared stationary for the bivariate mapping (
This framing of the agent's decision problem begs the question: Is there some stationary state? The following positive (albeit particular) answer is just a restatement of Ky Fan's inequality [3] , [11] :
Theorem 2.1 (on existence of stationary states). Suppose X is a non-empty compact convex subset of a topological vector space X: Also suppose b(x 1 jx 0 ) be quasi-concave in x 1 2 X; lower semicontinuous in x 0 2 X; and b(x 0 jx 0 ) 0 8x 0 : Then there exists at least one stationary state. Theorem 2.1 points to topological vector spaces as tractable settings. It also emphasizes the roles of closed convex preferences.
Granted existence of at least one stationary state, how might the agent eventually reach one of those -and come to rest there? As in [19] , [26] it's convenient to model his step-wise adjustments in terms of a point-to-set correspondence A : X X. From some accidental or historical point x 0 2 X; there emanates an iterative process
Process (5) would be self-defeating if it stops prior to stationarity. Put di¤erently, each …xed point x 2 A(x) should be a stationary state (4). Conversely, (5) ought halt if it reaches a stationary state. In synthesis, for any …xed or limiting correspondence, say A : X X, considered in the sequel, it's tacitly required that
5 If moreover, C(x 1 x 0 ) = 0 i¤ x 1 = x 0 ; then adjustment cost is an asymmetric distance [7] .
A leading instance takes the form
where c : X X ! R + [ f+1g reports transitional costs. Reasonably, posit c(x jx) = 0 for all x 2 X.
Proposition 2.1 (on appropriate cluster points). Let X be a closed subset of a topological space X. Suppose (5), (7) generate a summable sequence
Further suppose that each non-stationary point x 2 X has some neighborhood N and number > 0 such that
Then, either the sequence (x k ) is …nite with a stationary last point -or, every cluster point of the in…nite sequence must be stationary.
Proof. In the viable set X, let x = lim k2K x k for some in…nite subsequence K of natural numbers. Suppose x isn't stationary. With no loss of generality, take
Remark (on upper bounded criteria). Prop. 2.1 …ts instance (3) with bounded above and c; C := C=2.
For greater ‡exibility one may replace the time-invariant A in (5) with stage-dependent correspondences A k : X X to have
De…nition 2.2 (on asymptotic closure and regularity). When the space X is topological, a limiting correspondence A : X X closes the sequence (A k ) if
If the space
In these terms, the following result is immediate -and it it structures some subsequent arguments:
Proposition 2.2 (on stationary cluster points). Suppose (X; d) is metric and that A : X X closes an asymptotically regular sequence (A k ): Then, each cluster point
For illustration of (8), replace bene…t-cost functions b, c with stage-dependent versions b k : X X ! R[ f 1g and c k : X X ! R + [ f+1g : Then, (7) takes the generalized form
Proposition 2.3 (on convergence). Let (X; d) be a complete metric space and X X non-empty closed. Suppose (A k ), as de…ned in (10), be closed by A: Also suppose that for any initial x 0 2 X, some number > 0 yields
Then (A k ) is asymptotically regular, and sequence (x k ) generated by (10) converges to a stationary point.
Proof. Since the metric space is complete, (11) implies that x k ! x for some unique limit x. Also by (11), there is asymptotic regularity: d(x k+1 ; x k ) ! 0: Hence, by closure (9), x 2 A(x), and stationarity derives from (6).
Non-cooperative games
Accommodated henceforth is a …xed …nite ensemble I of "players", at least two of them.
By a strategy pro…le x = (x i ) is meant a mapping i 2 I 7 ! x i 2 X i where X i is a non-empty "viability set"in some ambient space X i of alternatives. Given a strategypro…le x 0 = (x De…nition 3.1 (non-cooperative stationary states). A strategy pro…le x 2 i2I X i is declared stationary -and a Nash equilibrium modulo cost of change -i¤
In some special instances, such multi-agent stationarity adds nothing to the customary concept of Nash equilibrium [18] :
Proposition 3.1 (on stationary states as ordinary Nash equilibria). Suppose player i 2 I worships gross bene…t i : X ! R[ f 1g ; and that Then, a state x is stationary i¤ it's a customary Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative game G := ( i ; X i ) i2I , meaning
Prop. 3.1 mentions no adjustment costs. Each player agent is fully goal-driven. Nobody is ever troubled by friction or inertia. More realistically, following the lead of proximal point methods, one may posit
for some cost function C i :
. 6 That function could be asymmetric in the agent's own arguments (x
depends on the entire pro…le x 0 …ts games featuring congestion [22] or use of common resources [9] , [10] .
If a Nash solution isn't unique, (14) bears on equilibrium re…nement, selection and stability. While i (x 1 i ; x i ) is the customary Nash maximand, (14) includes a perturbation -apt to select more robust equilibria. Conversely, cost of change could lock agents into equilibria which otherwise would not withstand minor nudges. This line of inquiry is not pursued here.
In whatever form, b i (x 1 i jx ) is meant to measure cardinal betterment for player i: Contending with ordinal comparisons, there is a noteworthy link to characterization and existence of stationary points: Proposition 3.2 (on concave ordinal improvements). For each i 2 I, suppose X i is a non-empty compact convex subset of some topological vector space X i . Further suppose that
with gross bene…t function i : X ! R concave in x 1 i 2 X i and continuous in x 0 2 X: Then, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the game G = ( i ; X i ) i2I . Moreover, each such equilibrium is a stationary state (12) . So, x = (x i ) is a Nash equilibrium. From (15) follows that x must be stationary.
Prop. 3.2 …ts the instance (14) when all
for some player-independent generalized ordinal potential P : X ! R[ f 1g. Then, P may replace i in (15) .
In many games, strategic interaction works via objectives and constraints. 7 Besides individual restrictions that x i 2 X i 8i; choice could be subject to collective, coupling constraints in that each strategy pro…le x = (x i ) must belong to a non-empty, non-rectangular subset X i2I X i . Then, letting
and modifying (12), x is stationary -and declared a generalized Nash equilibriumi¤ (4) holds. 8 Theorem 2.1 immediately entails Theorem 3.1 (on stationary states and generalized Nash equilibria). Suppose X is a non-empty compact convex subset of a topological vector space X.
is quasi-concave in x 1 and lower semicontinuous in x; then there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium.
This solution concept selects among "ordinary"Nash equilibria, satisfying (4).
Stackelberg games
Stationarity (12) …ts normal-form games, but it's less apt for settings with extensiveform interaction. 9 To illustrate some of the di¢ culties that emerge, this section concludes by considering two-player, two-move instances of Stackelberg (or principalagent) sort [14] .
A leading player 1 …rst chooses some x 1 2 X 1 . Observing that choice, a responding player 2 follows up with some choice x 2 2 X 2 : Thereafter, given x = (x 1 ; x 2 ); they collect upper semicontinuous payo¤s 1 (x) and 2 (x) respectively. Both sets X 1 ; X 2 are compact.
In principle, the follower reduces to a strategic dummy, just selecting some best response x 2 2 R(x 1 ) := arg max
7 See [8] , [10] , [9] , [10] and references therein. 8 Provided b i (x 1 i jx ) be quasi-concave in x 1 i and lower semicontinuous in x; format (16) …ts Theorem 2.1.
9 Following [19] , Section 1.2.2, players might memorize the preceding path of play, and history could a¤ect the continuation. This idea is not pursued here.
In contrast, up front, the leader ought maximize 1 (x 1 ; R(x 1 )) subject to x 1 2 X 1 :
His task is often rather demanding. He had better foresee or guess -or outright be told -the entire response correspondence R: Moreover, if some R(x 1 ) isn't a singleton, which selection therein appears appropriate?
To see some prospects for learning to interact, suppose the game be played iteratively. By assumption, entering stage k = 0; 1; :: with most recent choices x k 1 ; x k 2 already sunk, the respective players use approximate payo¤ functions
Inequalities (17) re ‡ect two features. First, either agent incurs some cost of change. Second, approximate payo¤s are underestimates. Suppose that
Assumptions (18), (19) capture that ultimately, when play settles, cost of change, becomes negligible. At stage k the leader expects that the follower will apply a single-valued response function r k : X 1 ! X 2 . His expectation is approximately rational in so far as
On these premises, at stage k; the leader chooses an update
After observing x k+1 1 ; the follower comes up with a best response
Note that because of the sequential mode of play, the coupled updatings
do not …t (10) . Nonetheless, it holds:
Proposition 4.1 (convergence in Stackelberg games). Suppose each function x 2 X 7 ! i (x) is upper semicontinuous, and that the leader's objective 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) is lower semicontinuous in x 2 2 X 2 : Also suppose that for any point = ( 1 ; 2 ) 2 X and sequence
Then, if r k converges continuously to r, meaning
it holds for each limit point x 1 = lim x k 1 that x 1 2 arg max 1 ( ; r( )) and r(x 1 ) 2 arg max 2 (x 1 ; ):
Proof. The …rst inequality derives from the upper semicontinuity of 1 : The last follows from the lower semicontinuity of 1 ( 1 ; ) and (23 The …rst inequality derives from the upper semicontinuity of 2 ; the last from (22) . Thus, x 2 2 arg max 2 (x 1 ; ), and the proof is complete. And, when will these converge continuously? These questions go beyond the scope of this paper. Su¢ ce it to say that, for …nite-action games, …ctitious play may o¤er insights [4] , [20] , [23] ; for games with continuous actions spaces, see the proximal point procedures in [5] .
